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Abstract
Given the ideological and institutional di®erences between Bismarckian and Beveridgean pension systems,
European e®orts to develop a common pension market have proved a formidable problem for the European
Commission. Why did pension market integration fail in the early 1990s but made a successful return
onto the EU Commission's agenda more than a decade later? This paper argues that the creation of a
pension fund directive in 2003, a crucial step along the way towards a single pension market, is not the
result of neoliberal ascendency, but the product of structural change and e®ective agenda-setting by the
European Commission. The shift from an industrial to a service economy, as well as a range of pension
reforms in Bismarckian nations, provided a window of opportunity for the Commission to invite member
states to negotiate a single pension market. Secondly, learning from past negotiation failure induced EU
administrators to use their agenda-setting tools more e®ectively, including limiting the range of policy
issues under consideration, reducing uncertainty about member states' true reform types, and building
coalitions with key member states.
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11 Introduction
In Kingdon's (1995) famous formulation, agenda control is \an idea whose time has come." The innovation
that sweeps over existing patterns of policymaking is said to consist of several stages: (1) the setting of
the agenda, (2) the speci¯cation of alternatives from which a choice is to be made, (3) an authoritative
choice among those speci¯ed alternatives, and (4) the implementation of the decision (Kingdon 1995, p. 3).
A productive stream of research has focused on the ¯rst two processes, generating important insights on
why certain policies are seriously considered by political incumbents while several alternatives are ignored.
However, the last two stages have received only scant attention. This omission is surprising, given variation
in the e®ective use of agenda-setting tools.1 A prominent place on a given policy agenda is no guarantee that
an item will attain legislative passage, let alone implementation according to legislative intent. This paper
seeks to understand agenda-setting in the context of pension market integration in the European Union. The
goal of this paper is not only to explain how a \non{European" topic such as occupational pensions arrived
on the supranational agenda, but also to specify the political and economic circumstances under which the
EU Commission may use its agenda-setting tools e®ectively.
The existing literature usually attributes impasse between the member states to the unwillingness of
major power holders to recognize the need for change because of commitment to a peculiar ideology, group
bene¯ts, or to the resistance of institutions (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). If the forces pushing for change
are too weak, gridlock dominated by veto-players results. Yet, an exclusive focus on domestic institutions and
cognitions in the member states ignores the possibility that the agenda-setting process itself may have been
°awed, or that the economic environment in which bargaining took place may have been unfavorable for the
issue under consideration. As Kitschelt has demonstrated, there are opportunities of \framing" policy issues
that can make it easier for politicians to overcome resistance to change (Kitschelt 2001). Thus, the more
interesting question is, which agenda-setting or manipulating tools are most e®ective in overcoming friction,
given the existence of multiple veto-players both across and within member states? One way of studying
this issue was proposed by Bachrach and Baratz in their seminal article Two faces of power (Bachrach and
Baratz 1962). The authors suggest that powerful agenda-setting does not only manifest itself in key political
decisions, but also in the ability to prevent decisions or contests from arising in the ¯rst place (Bachrach
and Baratz 1962, p. 949).
1One of the few pieces analyzing the e®ectiveness of agenda-setting in the European Union is provided by Tsebelis and
Proksch. The authors attribute the successful creation of a European draft constitution to shrewd agenda-setting by the
Convention president (Tsebelis and Proksch 2007).
2We apply this approach to the analysis of pension market integration in the European Union. The dearth
of research on common European pension policies is surprising, given the profound implications integration
e®orts in this sector have for national regulations of labor relations, capital °ows, and social protection.
More speci¯cally, we ask why the initial attempt to pass a European pension fund directive failed in 1991,
whereas a subsequent endeavor came to fruition in 2003.2 We argue that the successful passage of the IORP
pension directive in 2003 is not due to a di®usion of neoliberal ideas. An ideational consensus existed neither
for the desirability nor institutional shape of a single pension market. Instead, we identify two factors, struc-
tural change and e®ective agenda-setting by the EU Commission, that are causally linked to the creation
of the IORP pension fund directive. The di±culty of reaching a consensus was signi¯cant and the level of
integration varies across issue areas. The knowledge of how it was done may improve our understanding of
agenda control more generally, which was recently identi¯ed as one of the main challenges of research on the
European Union (Princen 2007).
The following part outlines how structural change, in particular the shift from an industry-based to a
service economy and recent pension reforms, lowered opposition of Bismarckian nations to European pension
market integration. However, the story of structural change and economic integration is, on its own, incom-
plete, because it neither predicts legislative passage nor institutional design of EU directives. The ideas that
eventually shaped the design of the pension fund directive diverged in many ways from those of neoliberal
politicians, multinational companies, and like-minded EU bureaucrats. While economic integration provided
the EU Commission with an opportunity to devote more attention to the issue of pension market integration,
e®ective agenda-setting by Commission bureaucrats is causally responsible for the eventual adoption and
design of the IORP directive. Highlighting the role of uncertainty and economic context in the agenda-
setting process, the key claim is that the Commission's most e®ective manipulating tools included limiting
the range of policy issues under consideration, reducing uncertainty about member states' true reform types,
and building coalitions with key member states.
2Directive 2003/41/EC, also known as the IORP directive (institutions for occupational retirement provision).
32 How did pension policies get on the European agenda?
\Pensions are not an EU responsibility, and a chapter on this topic as such may seem out of place." The
opening line of Pochet's chapter captures the image of the proverbial man or woman on the street pondering
the European dimension of pension policies (Pochet 2003). It is well-known that national governments are
intensely jealous of their authority over social policy. Even though social policy autonomy is not an essential
attribute of national sovereignty, welfare programs have long been regarded as a powerful tool of govern-
ments to assemble broad political support. This paper argues that recent developments at the European level
jeopardize the Westphalian conception of pension policies, albeit only with regard to private and employer
sponsored, but not social security, pensions. Thus, European pension policies may be understood as issues
that are not \truly" European, but arrived on the agenda because domestic actors had a range of motives
to push for consideration of the issue (Princen 2007, p. 34).
What is driving the development of European pension policies? Our argument di®ers from two rival
hypotheses on cooperation in the international political economy literature. The ¯rst school of thought has
identi¯ed a neoliberal policy consensus as the source of cooperative outcomes regarding European economic
integration (Pauly 1997; McNamara 1998). McNamara traces the emergence of this ideational consensus to
member states' experiences with a series of macroeconomic policy failures in the aftermath of the ¯rst oil
crisis, which weakened existing economic and social arrangements. A di®erent account is provided by Abde-
lal, who also attributes international monetary cooperation to ideological change but rejects the notion that
the liberal rules were written in the United States or Great Britain and only afterwards spread to Europe.
Instead, he ¯rmly locates the desire to liberalize international capital °ows in the European member states
themselves, contending that the decision of French bureaucrats to liberalize capital controls prompted the
European Union, OECD, and IMF to compete with each other to control the issue area (Abdelal 2007, p.
31®.). This paper shares Abdelal's skepticism about the centrality of neoliberal ideas in shaping macro-
economic cooperation, as well as his con¯dence in the causal role of both member state preferences and
supranational agenda-setting in shaping European Union politics.
The second line of research this paper challenges is the notion that left-wing e®orts to build a \social
Europe" are causally linked to pension market integration (Hutsebaut 2003). We do not dispute that social
aspects of the IORP directive, such as the level of risk coverage pension funds should be required to provide,
were frequently discussed in the European Parliament. However, the push for EU-wide harmonization of
4pension regulations came from sectoral interests demanding a level playing ¯eld for fair competition in the
area of occupational pension management. As ¯nancial market integration progressed, banks, insurance, and
investment companies were granted permission to operate EU-wide on the basis of a single license. This mea-
sure prompted pension funds, represented by the European Federation for Retirement Provision (EFRP), to
lobby for their own \single passport" to o®set their competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis other ¯nancial service
providers (EFRP 2001). Furthermore, multinational companies saw economies of scale if they could manage
all of their employees' pension claims in a single country, alleviating the need to familiarize themselves with
social, investment, tax, and labor laws in ¯fteen member states.
3 The battle of the systems
While competition issues propelled pension market integration onto the European agenda, the creation of
European pension market represented a classic cooperation problem: it was desirable in principle, but deep
divisions over both goals and instruments of adjustment trapped member states in a political impasse. These
divisions stemmed from the di®erent philosophies and institutional structures underpinning Beveridgean and
Bismarckian pension cultures.
Bismarckean governments found the construction of a common pension market politically more costly
than their Beveridgean counterparts. Occupational pensions play only a minor role in Bismarckian nations,
and any European-wide framework would put the domestic pension industry at a comparative disadvantage.
Pension funds in these countries are typically subject to heavy regulatory restrictions and investment limits,
making it di±cult for the pension industry to develop or attract the asset{liability skills that are abundant in
Beveridgean nations (Deutsch 2002). Furthermore, the lack of an equity culture tends to make both politi-
cians and bene¯ciaries skeptical about any pension funding regulations, regardless of domestic or EU-level.
Beveridgean governments, by contrast, faced lower costs of reform. This is because their countries feature
comparatively mature corporate pension systems, an internationally competitive pension industry, skilled
asset-liability managers, and liberal investment regulations according to the prudent man rule. Occupational
pension schemes rarely o®er expensive biometric risk coverage (Blake 2003; BÄ orsch-Supan and Miegel 2001;
Davis 2000; Daykin 1996; Lynes 1997). While Bismarckian pension systems emphasize pension security,
5pension policy in liberal states developed along di®erent lines, with commercial and monetary interests dom-
inating (Whiteside 2006, p. 44).
Given the divergent pension cultures these governments represent, they envisaged radically di®erent ver-
sions of a European-wide framework. While Beveridgean member states preferred to implement the single
pension market based on high harmonization of investment regulations, high harmonization of funding re-
quirements, and no harmonization of biometric risk coverage, their Bismarckian counterparts envisioned the
polar opposite: maintenance of quantitative investment limits, no harmonization of funding requirements,
and high harmonization of biometric risk coverage. In short, the two types had di®erent political ideal points
corresponding to divergent levels of integration. The following section explores the sensitivity of governments
and pension institutions to these tradeo®s.
4 Harmonization requirements for pension market integration
4.1 Taxation
The main barrier to pan-European arrangements is that tax deductibility for contributions to a foreign pen-
sion scheme is not allowed. Without a common taxation framework that prevents mobile employees from
being double taxed { or from paying no taxes on retirement income at all { the movement of pension rights
across borders will remain a chimera. Taxation of pension assets can kick in at three points: when contribu-
tions are made, investment income is paid, or pensions are disbursed. The international standard is taxation
in the bene¯ts phase, wherein only disbursed pensions are subject to taxation, but not contributions or
investment return (EET approach: contributions exempt, investment income exempt, bene¯ts taxed). The
EU Commission initially recommended this standard for EU-wide adoption. However, major opposition to
tax harmonization came from countries that do not tax pension funds on the basis of EET: Denmark, Italy,
and Sweden have the ETT system (contributions exempt, taxed investment income and taxed bene¯ts), and
Germany and Luxembourg operate a TEE system (taxing contributions and exempting investment income
and bene¯ts). The fundamental reorganization of a country's tax system constitutes a prominent example
of politicians' notorious di±culty to make intertemporal policy investments (Jacobs 2004). Reelection seek-
ing incumbents are usually unwilling to take on the transitional costs associated with initial revenue losses
involved in revamping the tax structure.
64.2 Investment rules
The second change the EU Commission proposed was the EU-wide adoption of the prudent man rule that
prohibits pension funds from making risky investments. Yet pension funds in most Beveridgean nations al-
ready invest pension assets according to the prudent man rule, thus no adjustment costs accrue in this area.
Yet, member states with Bismarckian pension systems found the creation of a European single pensions
market politically considerably more costly than their Beveridgean counterparts. Pension funds in these
countries are typically subject to heavy regulatory restrictions and investment limits, making it di±cult for
the pensions industry to attract the pension management skills it needs to be competitive (Estevez-Abe,
Iversen, and Soskice 2001; Iversen and Soskice 2001; Deutsch 2002). In addition to the fear of foreign
competition, Bismarckian countries justi¯ed the rejection of the prudent man rule { which for them meant
investment liberalization { on the grounds that investors need protection against market risk, although the
e®ectiveness of quantitative investment limits for reducing risk has been contested in the literature (NÄ urk
and Schrader 1995). Restrictive investment rules are generally a re°ection of a risk-averse society that lacks
an equity culture. For example, before the adoption of the 2003 directive, British and Dutch funds were free
to invest more than 5 percent of pension fund assets in any sponsoring company. German funds, however,
had to meet no fewer than six separate limits: they could not invest more than 30 percent in EU equities, not
more than 25 percent in EU property, not more than 6 percent in non-EU equity, not more than 6 percent
in non-EU bonds, and not more than 20 percent in overall foreign assets. Thus, while Beveridgean nations
lobbied for the EU-wide adoption of the prudent man rule, the Bismarckian nations wanted the opposite:
casting tough investment restrictions in stone.
4.3 Biometric risk coverage
Another obstacle to cross{border pension movements included divergent regulations of biometric risk cover-
age. The percentage of the population that has access to biometric risk bene¯ts varies considerably across
countries, and within the same country, across di®erent pension schemes. For example, while German pen-
sion plans routinely o®er biometric risk coverage, British plan sponsors o®er this coverage to a very limited
extent, or not at all. In Britain, social policies enter the utility of employers with a negative sign because
they do not ¯t with the high return/ high risk strategy British companies pursue. The provision of biometric
7risk coverage raises the labor costs of companies, decreasing overall pro¯tability. While Bismarckian nations
sought to force the European pension industry to provide certain expensive pension products, Beveridgean
countries wanted to leave that choice to individual pension institutions.
5 Uncertainty, learning, and reputational e®ects
The previous part demonstrated that the preferences of governments vary systematically with their exposure
to welfare-¯nance reforms that the creation of an EU-wide pension market requires. How did this \battle of
the pension systems" play out at the European level? Building on reputational models of repeated interac-
tion (Tomz 2007; Drazen 2000, ch. 6), the following section develops a theory of cooperation that highlights
the role of incomplete information and economic context in pension market integration. Standard political
economy models that presuppose complete information about member state preferences leave no room for
changes in impressions and therefore remove the possibility of learning or updating of beliefs. The theory
advanced here allows beliefs about types to be updated over time, thereby accounting for feedback e®ects
between EU Commission and member states.
The European Commission is the only institution that can propose legislation under the EU's legal order,
but proposals are not simply put to an up or down vote in the EU Parliament. To avoid the deeply embar-
rassing scenario of having to retract a proposal or being defeated in the formal decision-making process, the
Commission has an incentive to assemble broad political support before a proposal is put to a vote. Yet this
process, which typically entails informal deliberations prior to formal decision-making procedures, tends to
be fraught with uncertainty: ¯rst, the Commission does not automatically know the most fruitful way of
framing the issue under consideration in order to appeal to a broad majority. Secondly, each member state
only knows its own capacity and willingness to reform, including the strength of institutional constraints
and domestic veto players opposed to EU mandated change.
We assume that the true adjustment costs are private information of the respective governments. Because
the costliness of adjusting domestic pension systems to EU mandated legislation is not directly observable
from outside, governments have an informational advantage concerning their true reform types. This holds
in particular for a government's readiness to honor or default on debt obligations, of which pension liabilities
8constitute the largest part. Even though member state representatives and EU administrators meet in a
variety of places and have ample opportunity to exchange information, they have incentives to exaggerate the
existence of domestic veto players and institutional constraints to get a more favorable deal (Putnam 1988).
As many scholars have demonstrated, it makes a di®erence whether domestic constraints are perceived as
real or feigned (Schneider and Cederman 1994; BrÄ auninger, Cornelius, KÄ onig, and Schuster 2001; Hug and
KÄ onig 2002). Furthermore, if there is no underlying consensus on the goals and design of the single pen-
sion market, member state representatives might disagree on the best alternative despite all of the relevant
information being shared. Such systemic biases may induce negotiators not to fully disclose the severity of
constraints they face at home (Austen-Smith and Feddersen 2006, p. 209).
We contend that EU Commission and member states form beliefs by observing behavior in context: they
consider the country's pension reform record and the economic circumstances it faced. As explicated above,
any European pension market would in°ict more adjustment costs on Bismarckian states, because the liberal
bias of European pension policies tends to ¯t better with Beveridgean nations. Yet there is variation across
Bismarckian nations in their ability to adjust to EU mandated change. Di®erences in institutional structures,
such as the size of the service sector (Iversen and Wren 1998), the extent of public sector employment (Mar-
tin and Thelen 2007), state capacity to \impose" unpopular reform packages on social partners (Hassel and
Ebbinghaus 2000; van Wijnbergen 2002), as well as historical trajectories of social spending on certain age
groups (Lynch 2006) all in°uence the precise costs of reform and illustrate the heterogeneity of Bismarckian
nations. Thus, our theory of reputation entails two types of Bismarckian member states: \high cost" and
\low cost" reform types. Although adjustment to EU regulations are less painful for low cost types, they
will always try to mimic the high cost types { by exploiting the domestic constraints logic { in order to get a
more favorable agreement at the EU level. Because both types are not distinguishable when they pool their
behavior, the Commission forms beliefs about whether it is dealing with a \true" high cost type or with a
blu±ng low cost state.
Pension reforms provide clues about types that are di±cult to gauge directly. Because any pension reform
involving bene¯t reductions tends to be politically dangerous, reformers tend to get more accommodation
at EU-level negotiations. This is because domestic constraints arguments articulated by reformers are inter-
preted as stemming from the high cost type and are therefore deemed credible. Countries that do not have a
track record of painful pension reforms, by contrast, are branded as \blu®ers" who are exploiting the domes-
9tic constraints logic to get a better deal. The nature of national reform activity { pension bene¯t reduction or
expansion { provides the EU Commission with the necessary information to discern the member states' type.
6 Why political deliberations were not informative in 1991
The ¯rst attempt to create a single pension market was made in 1985, when it became clear that pension
funds had been forgotten in Jacques Delors' White Paper on the single market. Yet it was not until 1990
that the EU Commission began to take action in this ¯eld, when Director-General Leon Brittan outlined
the three freedoms which were critical to the pension fund industry: freedom of investment, freedom of
management, and cross-border membership (EFRP 2001).
However, neither Bismarckian nor Beveridgean systems were willing to reform their own welfare-¯nance
arrangements in order to promote integration, and instead urged the other side to adjust. Uncertainty about
member states' true domestic constraints, and the concomitant inability to distinguish cheap talk from credi-
ble signals, resulted in bargaining breakdown. The most contested issues { investment regulations, biometric
risk coverage, and taxation { were deemed \non-negotiable", and member states were stuck in positions of
principled opposition to the single pension market. Because the changes proposed by the EU Commission
would have been more costly for Bismarckian nations and therefore politically dangerous, these states o®ered
to create a single pension market that corresponded more closely to their own national institutional frame-
works.3 Yet, despite ostensibly legitimate concerns over the impact of the directive on domestic employers,
this countero®er was quickly dismissed by the liberal member states. The reason is that the countero®er was
not interpreted as a costly signal and therefore eroded the credibility of the domestic constraints argument.
Given that population aging and concomitant reform pressures weighed more heavily on PAYG pension
systems than on mature pension fund cultures, the liberal states adopted a wait and see attitude, refus-
ing to make any concessions to their conservative counterparts. As the Irish Association of Pension Funds
remarked at the time, \The Irish, British and Dutch pension systems are far more developed than those
existing in other EU countries and it is imperative that they be protected. It is better to have no directive
than a bad directive."4 Some member states, notably Germany, even tried to turn the draft proposal on its
3This countero®er included the maintenance of quantitative investment restrictions, compulsory biometric risk coverage, and
the limitation of the directive to o®-balance sheet pensions.
4The Financial Times, April 15, 2002.
10head. Although the Commission's goal was to liberalize freedom of capital across borders, the Bismarckian
states attempted to use the directive proposal to enshrine tough investment regulations, which ultimately
made it unattractive to the countries that had sought its adoption, in particular Britain, the Netherlands,
and Ireland (Interview with Commission administrator, 23 June 2006). As a result of this deadlock, the
Commission withdrew its proposal.
The following section analyzes the economic circumstances that made credible signaling at the EU-level
possible, inducing member states to stop pooling their responses and instead reveal their true economic
constraints. Economic change, national pension reforms, and e±cient agenda setting by the Commission
paved the way for the adoption of the 2003 pension directive.
7 Economic context
Our next task is to clarify why the EU Commission believed that re-opening negotiations a decade after the
failed ¯rst attempt might be fruitful. What was di®erent in 2003? Why did the ¯rst attempt to create a
single pension market in 1991 fail? Pension scholars typically locate the cause for national pension reforms
in the demographics of aging. But because unfavorable demographic trends have beset European societies
for decades, the timing of recent pension reforms suggests that other forces, in addition to aging, must have
been at work. The theory advanced here makes predictions about the e®ect of contextual variables. Agenda-
setting re°ects both the Commission's evaluation of member states' behavior and economic environment. In
the decade after the ¯rst directive proposal was withdrawn, structural change began to shift governments'
marginal utility for accumulating unfunded social security pension liabilities, particularly in Bismarckian
nations. These developments tipped member states' preferences in favor of the single pension market.
Economic change was essentially precipitated by the transformation of labor markets from a society
based on traditional industry and agriculture to a service-based economy (Iversen and Wren 1998). This
shift changed the relative demand for skilled and unskilled labor. While traditional employment patterns
had fueled expectations for a lifelong, uninterrupted job tenure, career structures in the service sector tend
to be intermittent. This implies that individuals have less opportunity to acquire both social security and
occupational pensions rights. Such an enormous occupational transformation is particularly problematic for
11younger generations, who are aware that social security pensions will not su±ce to maintain the standard of
living during the retirement phase, yet have limited opportunities to build up employer sponsored pension
rights because discontinuous employment arrangements, together with restrictive pension acquisition rules,
such as long waiting and vesting periods, prevent them from doing so.
Iversen and Cusack have pointed out that the magnitude of the employment dislocations depend on the
transferability of employees' skills: \When skills and bene¯ts do not travel well, while large numbers of
people face the risks of having to make such travels, one would expect demands for state-sponsored compen-
sation and risk sharing to be high". (Iversen and Cusack 2000, p. 326). Compensation for the lack of skill
transferability usually came in the form of early retirement or disability bene¯ts to make labor market exit
for older employees less painful and { equally importantly { to sugarcoat unemployment ¯gures. Yet active
labor market instruments were discredited, and often subject to budget cuts, when it became clear that em-
ployers exploited the early retirement option excessively for sta® reductions, leading to a dramatic increase
of bene¯ciaries entitled to unemployment assistance at a time when the pool of contributors continued to
shrink (Rosenow and Naschold 1994; Martin and Thelen 2007).
Experiences with such costly and ine®ectual state sponsored assistance is one of the reasons why Bis-
marckian governments were less opposed to European harmonization e®orts in the area of pensions. This is
because domestic reforms required to create a single pension market could be sold as a form of compensation
to the young and middle aged generation, who tend to be primarily targeted for cutbacks in social secu-
rity pensions. As pension scholars never tire to point out, the trickiest question associated with reforming
PAYG pension systems is how to avoid punishing one generation by requiring them to ¯nance their parents'
pensions while at the same time saving for their own (Myles and Pierson 2001). The single pension market
could thus be sold as a form of compensation: reduced PAYG pensions would be o®set by better access
to, and improved management of, occupational pension rights that are portable across borders. Given that
more than 60 percent of young Europeans consider the possibility of being able to work anywhere in the
European Union as an important right (Eurobarometer 1997, p. 113), the prospect of owning occupational
pension rights even in case of career moves abroad represents no small enticement. As a result, a variety of
recent legislative initiatives have aimed at expanding employer sponsored pensions. The next section takes
a closer look at the nature of reforms that were carried out in the member states.
128 Recent pension reforms: credible signals during hard times
Even though Bismarckian pension systems have nowhere been radically transformed, several steps have been
implemented in order to reduce the costliness of social security pensions and build up the underdeveloped
second pillar. A few countries have moved towards a greater reliance on occupational pensions by introducing
funded components to the ¯rst pillar. Others have raised the o±cial retirement age, lowered bene¯ts, or
reversed the previous trend towards early retirement. These changes (described below), even though incre-
mental, represented costly and therefore credible signals about member states' true reform types, indicating
that previous opposition to pension market integration may have moderated.
8.1 Moves toward funding
In 1998 Sweden has introduced funded components that were emulated throughout Scandinavia and con-
tinue to inspire reforms in other Bismarckian nations. Swedish pensions today are mainly based on so-called
notional de¯ned contributions and are linked to lifetime earnings. Most of the pension is ¯nanced through
PAYG, but 2.5 percent of income will go towards a funded pension administered by the state, with indi-
viduals able to choose their own fund. The level of pensions is based partly on the total contributions paid
during working life and partly on the average life expectancy at the time of retirement. It is then linked to
national economic growth. Because the scheme is based on actual contributions, it is reasonably stable and
although it is not immune to demographic changes, the e®ect of a rising proportion of pensioners is partly
o®set by linking pensions to life expectancy. It creates a \partnership" between PAYG and funded schemes,
although the funded element is small (Taverne 2001, p. 12).
Germany is another example that has introduced capital funded occupational pension plans. The so-
called \Riesterrente" was introduced by the social democratic government in 2001. Whereas ¯rms have
traditionally provided occupational pension coverage voluntarily, employees are now entitled to an occupa-
tional pension by their employer, albeit only in the form of wage conversions into future pension claims
(Schoden 2003, p. 26). This means that employers are now required to set up externally funded pension
plans at the request of workers. To support uptake of so-called \Riester{pensions" the government gener-
ously subsidized the conversion of up to 4 percent of net wages into future supplementary pension coverage.5
5Those subsidies are scheduled to run out in 2008.
138.2 Measures to raise the retirement age
Several countries have not only raised the o±cial retirement age but have taken steps to reverse the previ-
ous trend towards early retirement. In 1992, the German government mandated a phased increase of the
retirement age to 65 years with actuarial reductions in the case of early retirement (Schludi 2005, p. 132).
Moreover, the retirement age of women was increased.
Italy, which had a very complex system with di®erent o±cial retirement ages under di®erent schemes,
has raised the retirement age in the main state scheme from 55 to 60 for women and from 60 to 65 for men.
Italy is also phasing out the very expensive seniority pension, the pensioni d'anzienita, which allowed people
to qualify for al full pension after 35 years of work. \Italy's problem is not the need for fundamental reform,
because the basic issues have been tackled, but the need to speed up the time table for reforms already in
place." (Taverne 2001, p. 13).
After a spurt of reforms in the early 1990s, France has made only little recent progress in reforming its
pension system. There were drastic reforms of the basic pension and of the mandatory (PAYG) private sec-
tor occupational pension schemes in 1993. But attempts to reform the generous and expensive schemes for
public servants and employees of public companies have been postponed. France has some of the lowest legal
retirement ages in Europe, with an average of 50.3 to 59.9 for public employees and 61.2 in the private sector.
8.3 Steps to reduce bene¯ts
A variety of actions have been taken in di®erent countries to lower bene¯ts, either by linking them to prices
rather than earnings (Germany and Italy), or by changing the basis on which pensions were calculated
(France and Italy). The e®ect has been a lowering of replacement rates. In Germany, the Kohl government
introduced a demographic factor into the pension formula that would lead to a reduction of the standard
pension level from 70 percent to 64 percent, but his social democratic predecessor, in keeping with his
campaign promise, initially suspended it. The demographic factor was later reintroduced by the SchrÄ oder
government, with a target of 67 percent. However, the pension level is widely expected to decline further in
time (Schludi 2005).
148.4 Spread of the equity culture
Another factor alleviating resistance to pension funding may be the extent to which equity culture is gaining
ground within the European Union. An obvious example is the growth of mutual funds. This trend may
have a decisive in°uence on private pensions in the longer term. If people are happy to invest their savings
in equities, why should they object to equity-based pensions? Some scholars found that the public favors
private pensions. While the French government has often denounced the Anglo-Saxon approach to pensions,
Taverne found that 78 percent of the population favored private pension funds for employees, with only 18
percent opposed (Taverne 2001, p. 14).
Furthermore, privatization proceeds rapidly in the EU. Companies are increasingly looking to the mar-
kets for ¯nance. Hostile takeovers, which were once taboo on the continent, are becoming more frequent.6
There is an increasing concern with shareholder value and responsibilities to shareholders. While this does
not mean that the coordinated model of capitalism on the continent is being suddenly abandoned, these are
all signs that the equity culture has become an important in°uence.
9 Agenda-setting by the EU Commission
The previous section detailed the range of pension reforms that were carried out in the late 1990s and 2000s.
These reforms contributed to the member states' reputation and signaled to the Commission that princi-
pled opposition to pension market integration may have attenuated. Compared to PAYG social security
pensions, occupational pensions played only a minor role for a small number of people in 1991. By 2003,
however, several steps towards expanding the second pillar had been taken. The growth of nontraditional
employment patterns with concomitant deprivation of pension rights provided an additional opportunity for
the EU Commission to seize the issue area and invite member states back to the bargaining table.
However, this does not mean that agreement on a European pension directive was a foregone conclusion.
Although economic change altered the costliness of creating a single pension market, both Bismarckian and
Beveridgean endeavored to design the pension directive in accordance with their own national social and
¯nancial regulations. Because politicians tend to avoid far-reaching regulatory change in the area of pen-
6a prominent example is the takeover of Mannesmann by Vodafone.
15sions, neither side was keen on making concessions at the EU level just to return home with an agreement.
In many ways, no deal on pension market integration was still the favored outcome for reelection-minded
incumbents.
There is no consensus in the literature on the precise role of the EU Commission in in°uencing pension
policies. Some scholars consider the agenda-setting powers of the EU Commission in this area as seriously
limited because of its lack of ¯nancial resources and member state autonomy with regard to taxes and social
security. (Haverland 2005, p. 2). While Haverland correctly points to the inability of the Commission to
mandate redistributive regulations with regard to pensions, we argue that the Commission's agenda setting
power is not con¯ned to control over ¯nancial means. Other scholars recognize the role of the EU Commission
as an agenda-setter by pointing to discussion fora and three policy networks that stimulate debate at the
EU level (Pochet 2003). However, Pochet pays insu±cient attention to the e®ectiveness of these networks in
promoting a single pension market and does not analyze the Commission's strategic interaction with other
potentially important players, such as the European Parliament or Council.
We also take issue with the claim that the more complex the discussions at the European level are, the
more weight they carry, and the more options they o®er for dealing with the challenges of aging (Pochet
2003, p. 7). First, a top spot on the agenda neither guarantees legislative passage nor the implementation
of EU laws according to original intent. Secondly, complexity may sti°e e±cient decision-making, leading
either to ine®ectual directives or perpetual impasse. It is true that the creation of a single European pen-
sion market requires answers to many diverse questions, such as: should the social laws of the sending or
the receiving country apply? What kind of pension institutions should be subject to European supervisory
control? Should pension contributions, investment return, or the disbursed bene¯ts be taxed? However,
we argue that agreement at the European level is more likely when the agenda-setter is capable of reducing
complexity. The subsequent part analyzes the speci¯c manipulation tools the EU Commission used to ac-
complish this task.
1610 Limiting the agenda: separating taxation issues from pension
market integration
One method the EU Commission used to exercise agenda control included the elimination of particularly
controversial issues from negotiations altogether. The subject matter that turned out to be most divisive
during the 1991 deliberations was the question of how to tax occupational retirement income. The failure
to develop a uni¯ed tax system in the European Union has long been a bone of contention between EU
governments and multinational businesses. Each national tax authority allows some form of privilege to
funded pension arrangements, which makes them attractive for employers and employees. However, the tax
authorities are eager to make sure that any taxation of pensions ¯lls their own co®ers rather than those of
another member state. Some countries, notably Britain and Ireland, insist that national parliaments, and
not supranational institutions, should control taxation. Smaller states are opposed to tax harmonization
because tax competition o®ers opportunities for national development (Genschel 2005, p. 65).
The main reason why e®orts to unify the variety of taxation systems in the European Union into an EET
system was met with more political opposition than other issues, such as the harmonization of investment
regulations or social laws, is that the creation of common tax policies represents a classic time-inconsistency
problem: why incur costs in the present when the bene¯ts will not materialize until the far-away future, thus
bene¯ting the political successor? The strong reservations politicians in many European countries harbor
about exempting private or occupational pension savings from taxes and social security contributions stem
from the fear of major short-term revenue shortfalls, a®ecting social budgets in particular. Country-speci¯c
trajectories of taxation regulations cannot be changed over night from a national to a European dimension,
because political choices entailing high upfront costs and long maturation of bene¯ts tend to be politically
toxic.
These considerations lay at the heart of Germany's and Luxembourg's vocal opposition to tax harmo-
nization. Because the ETT system is a variation of the EET system, resistance to the reorganization of the
tax system was not as severe in Denmark, Italy, and Sweden (Van den Burg 2001, p. 11). But even countries
that operate on an EET basis expressed doubts about tax harmonization. The most common fear was that
some member states could, in e®ect, end up subsidizing others if they changed their tax laws. As the head
of pensions at Smith and Williamson, a UK-based consultancy, remarked: \Gordon Brown is never going to
17agree to parity with, for example, Italy, where state bene¯ts are much more generous than ours."7.
In light of the strong resistance in the member states the EU Commission came to realize that tax har-
monization is a political, rather than a technical or legal matter that militates in favor of a more gradual,
national reform approach. Thus, the Commission decided to divorce the broader goal of tax harmonization
from the deliberations on the single pension market, designating it as a separate issue area. EU administrators
involved in the failed 1991 negotiations who were interviewed for this project singled out tax harmonization
as the main obstacle for moving ahead with pension market integration. Regarding issues of tax harmoniza-
tion, one Commission administrator mentioned \In 1991, the member states simply had too much on their
plate. Taxation of pension funds turned out to be the biggest obstacle for the creation of a common pension
market." (Interview with Commission administrator, June 21, 2006). Another administrator added: \Tax
issues should have been excluded from the beginning, but we did not know that in the early 1990s. In 2003,
we knew better." (Interview with Commission administrator, June 20, 2006).
More than four decades ago, Schattschneider remarked that \all forms of political organization have a
bias in favor of the exploitation of some kinds of con°ict and the suppression of others because organization
is the mobilization of bias." (Schattschneider 1960, p. 71). The above discussion demonstrated that, after
heavy contestation at the EU-level in the early 1990s, the issue of taxation of European pension funds was
subsequently \organized out". This is because the EU Commission eventually realizes that the intertempo-
ral nature of the problem militated in favor of a more gradual approach at the domestic level. The next
section explores the issues that found their way onto the Commission's agenda and that were subsequently
\organized in".
11 Reducing uncertainty and building coalitions with key member
states
Another agenda-setting tool the EU Commission used e±ciently in 2003 was reducing member states uncer-
tainty about each others' reform types by holding long educational sessions in the EU Council. The main
supporters of pension market integration were Beveridgean pension fund cultures, including Great Britain,
7Financial Times, August 19, 2002
18Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark. The pension industry in those countries saw great po-
tential for growth in the creation of a single pension market, enabling them to get a foothold in countries
where pension funds were poorly developed. The maturity of the second pillar pension sector in Beveridgean
countries and abundance of skills in asset-liability management constituted a comparative advantage for the
pension industry vis-a-vis foreign competition.
The most powerful opponents included nations with Bismarckian pension systems, most notably Ger-
many and France, but also Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Southern European states. These countries had
vociferously opposed the Commission's 1991 directive proposal that recommended the liberalization of in-
vestment regulations for pension funds, relaxation of regulations governing the provision of biometric risks
coverage, and tax harmonization, among other things. The main reasons for the resistance is the underde-
veloped second pillar pension sector in those countries, as well as the magnitude of welfare-¯nance reforms
required for creating a single pension market.
The critical contribution of the Commission was to consult extensively not only with member state rep-
resentatives, but also with European union and business representatives, as well as the European Federation
for Retirement Provision. As a result of the Commission's decision to hold multiple sessions on pension
market integration in the Council, the member states learned two things: ¯rst, a better understanding of
member states' peculiar pension systems helped them realize what kind of policy change would so embarrass
their peers as to be unproductive. Secondly, they revealed what kind of changes might be politically feasible,
despite the existence of domestic veto points.
In 1991, no country wanted to implement welfare-¯nance reforms in order to achieve pension market
integration. However, changes in the economic environment, including structural change from an industry-
based to a service economy as well as the expansion of second pillar pensions, altered governments' utility
of creating a single pension market. In this environment, governments had an incentive to depart from their
principled opposition to pension market integration and instead explore room for maneuver.
The Commission's strategy of consulting widely and educating Council members about the peculiarities
of Bismarckian and Beveridgean pension systems contrasts starkly with the approach taken a decade earlier.
In 1991, the directive proposal was hurriedly drawn up and neither member state representatives, nor social
19partners or lobby groups, such as the EFRP, were extensively consulted. More importantly, the economic
environment in which deliberations took place was not conducive to credible deliberations. The disloca-
tions wrought by the contraction of the traditional employment sectors (agriculture and industry) were not
as painful as a decade later. More importantly, domestic PAYG pension cutbacks and measures taken to
expand employer sponsored pension coverage between 1992-2002 surpass the few minor reform initiatives
undertaken in the 1980s.
Strikingly, the criticism member states voiced regarding pension market integration di®ered considerably
in 1991 and 2003. Whereas in 1991 Bismarckian member states saw no common ground for compromise, they
were more open to an agreement in 2003, voicing only their strongest reservations against certain stipulations
in the directive. In 2003, member states and Commission agreed on a compromise regarding the previously
contested issues of investment rules and biometric risk coverage. Concerning investment rules, the directive
mandates that pension assets be invested according to the prudent man rule, signifying the liberalization
of investment regulations in Bismarckian nations. Regarding biometric risk coverage, the member states
agreed on mutual recognition, allowing Bismarckian states to set higher standards than their Beveridgean
counterparts.
Following this compromise, the pool of non-negotiable issues had shrunk considerably. What was eventu-
ally excluded from the scope of the IORP directive comprised only a few policy areas that were highly speci¯c
to certain pension systems and that the respective countries cared very intensely about. The most important
players in this game were the main opponents of change (Germany and France), the main supporter (Great
Britain), as well as the presidencies of the European Union between 2002 and 2003 (Spain and Italy). Let's
consider the crucial objections each harbored { and that were eventually accommodated { in turn.
11.1 Germany
Germany's main hesitation to support pension market integration originates from the pervasiveness of on-
balance sheet book reserve pensions. With 60 percent of all occupational pensions being book reserve pen-
sions, it constitutes the most popular form of employer sponsored pension in Germany. Firms prefer book
reserve pensions to externally funded pension institutions because it provides them with a cheap source of
¯nance as well as an e®ective sta® retention device. The creation of a single European pension market posed
20a threat to this cheap capital as well as to the long-term nature of German labor relations. This is because
\security concerns" by the EU Commission as well as other member states militated in favor of funding such
pensions. Yet, a broad societal coalition consisting of employers, unions, and the government fought hard,
and successfully, for the exemption of book reserve from the scope of the directive. Thus, article 2 (2e) in
the 2003 directive text speci¯es that the directive shall not apply to \companies using book reserve schemes
with a view to paying out retirement bene¯ts to their employees."
In return for exempting book reserve pensions from the directive, Germany decided to drop other reser-
vations it previously regarded as non-negotiable, including resistance to the liberalization of investment
regulations for pension funds, as well as its insistence on making the provision of biometric risk coverage
mandatory for the European pension industry. The Commission's acceptance that book reserve pension
schemes should be excluded from the directive induced Germany to make concessions in those issue areas.
The persuasion of one of the most powerful critics of the original directive sent a strong signal to other
reluctant member states. As one Commission administrator recalls: \We ¯nally understood that Germany's
biggest concern were the book reserve pensions. As soon as we got the Germans on board, it was much
easier to persuade other hesitant member states." (Interview with EU Commission administrators, June
20-23, 2006).
11.2 France
France was able to negotiate its way out of the pension fund directive relatively easily, declaring that France
simply does not have pension funds or schemes in the sense that they exist elsewhere in Europe. The second
pillar in France is essentially provided by ARRCO, for blue-collar workers and AGIRC for white-collar em-
ployees. Both deal with agreements internally and are highly regulated. The schemes are all jointly run by
unions and employers. Only a minority of employers makes pension promises beyond statutory requirements.
Of these, the majority take the form of book reserves, as in Germany. Consequently, France shared many
of Germany's doubts. A well-established EU regulation that exists since the 1970s was the solution in this
case (Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71 of 14 June 1971). This regulation lays down certain rules
for the management of pension schemes of employed persons, self-employed persons and members of their
families moving within the European Union. However, it explicitly excludes from its scope social security
schemes. Thus, by declaring that all occupational pension schemes fall under the 1408/71 regulation, France
21managed to exclude all French pension schemes from the scope of the 2003 directive. However, the directive
also speci¯es that no country must discriminate against foreign pension funds, indicating that France does
not escape the specter of foreign competition.
11.3 Great Britain
Because the City of London had a clear competitive advantage in the business of pension management vis-
a-vis ¯nancial centers in Bismarckian pension cultures, Britain stood to gain most from the liberalization of
investment regulations (Talani 2000). The occupational pension sector is mature, the pension fund industry
competitive, and asset{liability skills abundant. The prudent man rule is already used to invest pension
assets, thus relieving the country of any adjustment costs in this area. However, accommodating demands
by the powerful British pension funds, Britain successfully opposed German and French attempts to force
the European pension industry to o®er biometric risk coverage. Britain was initially opposed to exempting
book reserve pensions from the scope of the directive, arguing that lack of oversight by EU institutions would
give employers sponsoring such pensions an unfair advantage. However, given that the Bismarckian nations
eventually accepted a liberalization of investment regulations, as well as the principle of mutual recognition
regarding biometric risk coverage, Britain conceded. The Bismarckian states, on the other hand, reluctantly
agreed to article 16 (2), which speci¯es that member states may allow pension funds for a limited period of
time to have \insu±cient assets to cover technical provisions". This stipulation clearly re°ects the position
of the British pension funds, trumping the security concerns of the Bismarckian insurance industry.
11.4 The Spanish and Italian presidencies
Each member state, on taking up the presidency, has tended to give emphasis to directives that most closely
a®ect its own nationals. In 1993, a newspaper article warned that \if agreement on the [IORP] directive is
not reached by the end of the Belgian presidency (31 December 1993), the next ¯ve presidencies (Greece,
Germany, France, Spain and Italy) are unlikely to give this particular piece of EU legislation any priority,
because these countries do not at present have large and active private pensions industries." (European
Savings Markets, October 21, 1993). Given the underdeveloped second pillar pension sector in all of these
countries, neither the Spanish nor the Italian presidency was expected to push the issue of pension market
integration. And yet, the impasse in the Council was broken under the Spanish presidency in 2002, while
22the directive itself was signed into law under the Italian presidency in 2003.
Why would two member states contribute to progress on a policy issue that does not rank high on the
priority list of their own nationals? In the end, it came down to two issues: the prestige associated with shep-
herding a directive through the legislative process, and the exclusion of the issue that was most important
to the respective country. For Spain and Italy, it was most important that the pension fund directive also
applied to pension institutions that do not have legal personality. This is because in Italy and Spain, pension
funds are of the contractual form. In this case, pension funds do not have legal personality or capacity, but
the plan members have a legal title to the pension fund assets. The pension fund assets are held in an
account managed by a ¯nancial company for plan a±liates, where the account is legally separated from the
balance sheet of the managing entity (OECD 2001, p. 5). In the end, these concerns were accommodated by
Article 2 (1) of the 2003 directive text by speci¯cally including pension institutions without legal personality.
The nature of the compromise the European member states reached in 2003 reveals that the Beveridgean
states sacri¯ced more than their Bismarckian counterparts, whereas the latter made concessions in areas they
cared only marginally about. This outcome supports our hypothesis that the 2003 directive is the result
of reduced uncertainty about member states' domestic constraints, due to e®ective agenda setting by the
Commission. Although this directive constitutes a ¯rst step towards a single pension market, it is unlikely
that there will be an upsurge in cross-border pension portability anytime soon. It remains to be seen whether
individual member states will interpret the directive in ways that will increase or inhibit cross-border pension
transfers. Furthermore, sensitive issue areas such as taxation of transferred pension claims have yet to be
sorted out before we can speak of a truly integrated pension market.
12 Conclusion
This paper analyzed the European dimension of pension policies. We argued that competition issues, struc-
tural change, and domestic pension reforms opened a window of opportunity for the EU Commission to
invite deliberations on pension market integration. The disruption of traditional employment patterns and
concomitant loss of pension rights generated demands for improved access to, and e±cient management of,
occupational pensions. Furthermore, recent initiatives in Bismarckian nations to cut back social security pen-
23sions and expand the second pillar increased the salience of pension market integration at the European level.
While economic change a®orded demands for pension market integration more attention, it was e®ective
agenda control by the European Commission that is causally linked to adoption and design of the 2003
pension fund directive. By excluding issues of taxation from the purview of the directive, reducing uncer-
tainty about member states' true domestic constraints, and building coalitions with key member states, the
Commission helped foster a consensus between Bismarckian and Beveridgean states. This contrasts strongly
with the ¯rst attempt to create a pension fund directive in 1991, when member states had no incentives
to reveal their true domestic constraints and the Commission made no attempt to reduce member states'
uncertainty about each others' types. Even though the 2003 pension fund directive has been correctly criti-
cized as an incomplete legislative patchwork, the fact that ¯fteen member states were able to agree on some
welfare-¯nance harmonization makes it a bargaining success.
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